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CROSS-EXAMINATION OF  
IN DEFENSE OF KANT’S RELIGION
Stephen R. Palmquist
This article extends the metaphorical trial posed by the authors of In Defense 
of Kant’s Religion by cross-examining them with two challenges. The first 
challenge is for the authors to clarify their claim that they are the first inter-
preters to present “a holistic and linear interpretation” of Kant’s Religion that 
portrays it as containing a “transcendental analysis” of religious concepts, 
given that several of the past interpreters whose works they survey in Part 1 
conduct a similar type of analysis. The second is to compare the assumption 
pervading Part 2 of their book, that Kant conducts his first “experiment” 
in the first three Pieces and the second experiment in the Fourth Piece of 
Religion, with the previously defended view that the two experiments are 
weaved throughout all four Pieces. After observing several dangers this as-
sumption poses for affirmative interpreters of Kant’s philosophy of religion, 
I conclude by showing how the authors’ problem-driven hermeneutic led 
them to downplay various portions of Kant’s text.
Extending the Trial
I cannot hide my sympathy with the overall thrust of In Defense of Kant’s 
Religion (IDKR). Its masterful effort to resolve “the most common conun-
drums forwarded by Kant’s critics” (234)1 resonates so extensively with my 
own reading of Kant’s Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason that I would 
be foolish to minimize its significance. Nevertheless, merely singing the 
praises of its contribution to the recent “affirmative” trend in interpret-
ing Kant’s great (but hardly straightforward) philosophical classic would 
waste a valuable opportunity to advance the cutting edge of scholarship. 
Bypassing the statutory praises one gives at the outset of such critical 
reviews (but see note 15, below), I shall therefore move directly to the first 
of two questions, intended here to cross-examine the authors’ defense of 
Kant’s coherence.
In keeping with IDKR’s two-part division—first an overview of past 
interpreters’ positions, then a fresh attempt to interpret Religion, based on 
three novel interpretive assumptions—I begin by asking for clarification 
on how the authors understand their claims to IDKR’s uniqueness. My 
1Page references without other identifiers refer to Chris L. Firestone and Nathan Jacobs, 
In Defense of Kant’s Religion (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008).
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second question, stemming from IDKR’s Part 2, focuses on the legitimacy 
of one of its three interpretive innovations. I aim to offer the authors an 
opportunity to clarify where they stand on two issues that might other-
wise prevent readers from accurately assessing the nature and extent of 
their accomplishment.
Kant’s Religion as a Transcendental System
My first question is: What do you mean by your claim that IDKR uniquely 
presents “a holistic and linear interpretation” of Kant’s Religion that portrays it 
as containing a “transcendental analysis” of religious concepts?2 IDKR clearly 
does conduct such an analysis. What is puzzling is that the authors seem 
unaware that books in their own Bibliography have also done so. Given 
that Part 1 shows an impressive command of recent major trends in in-
terpreting Religion, the authors must not intend the quoted words in their 
ordinary sense. Hermeneutic charity constrains one to assume they are 
aware that some of the very interpreters whose works they summarize 
have written section-by-section commentaries portraying Religion as de-
fending a transcendental system. Unless the authors were either unaware 
of this or chose to ignore such previous attempts (neither assumption being 
charitable), they must have meant something idiosyncratic by “linear 
interpretation” and “transcendental analysis.”
If the authors insist they are using these terms in their normal sense, 
my first question would be a request that the authors clarify why they 
failed to acknowledge that their approach in Part 2 follows an already 
established motif. Not in dispute is that IDKR uniquely responds to the 
challenges of certain specific allegations against the coherence of Kant’s sys-
tem. But Part 2 claims to accomplish far more than this, as if there simply 
are no precursors to their linear, transcendental analysis. Thus, this first 
challenge appears to be stronger: to explain how their understanding of a 
linear transcendental analysis differs fundamentally from past interpret-
ers’ understanding of these terms. Several examples that appear to contra-
dict their claim will highlight the urgency of this challenge.
Allen Wood, the past defender of Kant’s coherence with whom IDKR 
interacts most often in Part 2, initiated the affirmative shift in interpret-
ing Kant’s Religion, though he did not traverse very far down the path he 
forged. While much of his Kant’s Moral Religion examines religious impli-
cations of theories advanced in Kant’s Critiques, three chapters discuss 
Kant’s Religion. Wood presents a text-based analysis of the key arguments 
in the First and Second Pieces.3 His analysis is linear, though not holistic, 
since he offers only cursory comments on the Third and Fourth Pieces. 
2IDKR 233; cf. 154 and throughout Part 2.
3In referring to the four “Books” of Religion, I follow Werner Pluhar’s recent transla-
tion of Kant’s Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2009), calling 
each Book a “Piece”—this being the literal translation of Kant’s term, Stück. Kant probably 
used this term because he initially wrote these four essays as “pieces” for publication in 
Berlinische Monatsschrift.
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Moreover, although the early Wood’s preferred motif is quasi-existentialist, 
he focuses on the role of the disposition as Kant’s key to establishing a 
non-empirical account of conversion, thus highlighting that Kant’s analysis 
is transcendental.4 It is odd that the authors chose Wood’s linear transcen-
dental analysis and his account of the centrality of the disposition as 
their primary partner in dialogue: Wood could not have responded to the 
“conundrums” IDKR attempts to resolve, because they were all advanced 
after Wood wrote his book!
Without mentioning each Kant-interpreter featured in IDKR, we can 
assume at least some would regard their books as having progressed 
further than Wood in making Kant’s Religion coherent. Would John 
Hare, for example, accept the claim that his Kant’s Moral Gap contains no 
linear, transcendental analysis of Religion? IDKR defines “linear inter-
pretation” as “one where [the text’s] arguments are understood to build 
on one another by unpacking underdeveloped concepts from [Kant’s] 
critical philosophy in ways that are intricate and insightful” (233). Do 
the authors seriously deny that some past interpreters of Religion have 
done exactly that?
Consider Sidney Axinn’s The Logic of Hope. IDKR lists this book in the 
Bibliography (262) and refers to it once (257), yet never points out that 
Axinn’s Chapter 3 is a lengthy, section-by-section analysis of Religion, 
explicitly aiming to establish the text’s holistic coherence.5 Axinn conducts 
a rigorous logical analysis of the arguments that appear problematic, given 
Kant’s strictures on knowledge—this being the precise nature of the 
alleged conundrums IDKR defends Kant against. IDKR never considers 
the position Axinn defends, that Religion might be inherently ambiguous 
because human persons are inherently ambiguous, so that Kant’s portrayal 
of religion is both accurate and deep precisely because of the (apparent) 
conundrums IDKR claims to dispel. Like Axinn, other past interpreters 
think Kant’s emphasis on hope is rooted in his unwillingness to take refuge 
in the kind of metaphysical “cognitions” the authors claim Kant establishes 
in Religion. Curiously (given the in-depth literature review in Part 1), 
IDKR offers no example of an Axinn-type affirmative approach.
In case I am misunderstanding other interpreters’ positions, this first 
line of questioning concludes by referring to my own publications on 
Religion. My first conversation with one of IDKR’s authors was sparked 
by his interest in my then-recent (1992) Kant-Studien article, “Does Kant 
Reduce Religion to Morality?” That article offers a resounding “No” to 
its title’s question, suggesting we should instead read Religion as raising 
morality to the level of religion. In defending this position, I present a 
linear summary of Kant’s entire argument, portraying Religion as a sys-
tem of transcendental conditions for the possibility of religion. That essay 
appears (revised) as Chapter VI of Kant’s Critical Religion (KCR), where it 
4Allen Wood, Kant’s Moral Religion (Ithaca: Cornell, 1970), 180, 203, 230.
5Sidney Axinn, The Logic of Hope (Atlanta: Rodopi, 1994), 67–138.
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prepares for Part Three’s tracing of Kant’s systematic argument through 
every section of Religion;6 Chapter VII analyzes Kant’s “attempt” (Versuch) to 
construct a system of rational religion (his so-called “first experiment”7); 
Chapter VIII analyzes his “attempt” to render Christianity consistent with 
that system (his second experiment); Chapter IX adopts the opposing, bib-
lical theologian’s Perspective, outlining a Christian theology that remains 
Kantian. KCR’s threefold analysis covers every major aspect of Kant’s text 
discussed by IDKR, including the transcendental character of the “arche-
type” (or prototype) as a metaphysical “gift” without which “conversion 
would be impossible” (KCR, 162). Yet IDKR virtually ignores KCR’s Part 
Three. The only hint that these lengthy chapters exist comes in Part 1: “To 
unpack all the idiosyncrasies of Palmquist’s approach to Religion [i.e., of 
KCR’s Part Three] would take us well beyond the confines of the required 
testimony” (24). IDKR’s summary of KCR’s position focuses instead on 
KCR’s claims about the metaphysical grounding of Kant’s Critical philoso-
phy in the mystical writings of Swedenborg; to make this point, the au-
thors admittedly need not summarize KCR’s analysis of the coherence of 
Kant’s Religion as a transcendental system. In the context of the courtroom 
metaphor adopted in IDKR’s Part 1, this neglect of KCR’s interpretive 
heart may be legitimate. But is it legitimate to go on in Part 2 to defend 
an interpretation of Religion that closely resembles and was directly 
influenced by KCR’s, without ever acknowledging the similarity?8 Only if 
the authors meant something idiosyncratic by “holistic and linear” and 
“transcendental analysis.”
IDKR exhibits several worrying indications that this charitable read-
ing may be unwarranted. Part 1 presents KCR’s Kant as an outright mystic, 
missing the point of the qualifier “Critical” in “Critical mysticism.” KCR 
never portrays Religion as an explicit defense of any kind of mysticism (not 
even “Critical”). Quite to the contrary, “Critical” mysticism means (in part) 
that the Critical System provides a philosophical grounding for a properly 
mystical life, in contrast to Swedenborg’s fanatical mysticism. When Kant 
6Stephen Palmquist, Kant’s Critical Religion: Volume Two of Kant’s System of Perspectives 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000). KCR applies the systematic assumptions introduced in volume 
one (KSP), Kant’s System of Perspectives: An Architectonic Interpretation of the Critical Philosophy 
(Lanham: University Press of America, 1993). These assumptions form a backdrop but are 
not the focus of KCR’s Part Three, whose exposition is an explicitly transcendental interpre-
tation of Religion (see KCR, 142 and passim). Our authors apparently mistook the backdrop 
inherited from Volume One (i.e., the “architectonic”) to be the purpose of KCR.
7Pluhar is the only English translator who consistently uses “experiment(s)” for both of 
Kant’s initial references to these two “attempts” (Versuche) in Religion 12.
8In presenting the Palmquist-Wood contrast (103–104), IDKR never acknowledges KCR’s 
basic claim, that Religion bridges Kant’s theoretical and practical systems. IDKR adopts the 
term coined in KSP, “judicial standpoint” (see e.g., KSP, 62, 355–356), to describe the syn-
thetic role Religion plays in Kant’s architectonic; yet IDKR, not acknowledging this as KCR’s 
position, falsely portrays KCR’s interpretation of Religion as appealing to the symbolic mys-
tery of mystical irrationality! For a good illustration of the cognitive content conveyed by 
Kantian symbolism, on my view, see the interpretation of the archetype/prototype in KCR 
161–163, 207–216, and further development of that position in my essay “Could Kant’s Jesus 
Be God?,” International Philosophical Quarterly 52:4 (forthcoming, December 2012).
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wrote Religion he had completed his Critical groundwork for metaphysics, 
and so also his implicitly analogous Critical groundwork for mysticism. 
Religion is therefore no more a defense of mysticism than a defense of meta-
physics as such. Moreover, IDKR’s Part 2 portrays KCR’s approach even more 
inaccurately: each of the authors’ several references is either confusing or 
commits outright exegetical error.9
Rather than acknowledging its relevance, IDKR misleadingly labels 
KCR as defending the “Religion-as-Symbol thesis” (209). One aspect of 
KCR’s interpretation of Religion could be called a “Faith-as-Symbol thesis”; 
but this is very different. Religion, on my reading of Kant, puts believers 
in touch with an inner, transcendental reality that concrete symbols of 
faith must point to in order to retain meaningfulness; but religion cannot 
be reduced to these symbols! IDKR is completely correct to advance this 
claim (209), except insofar as to imply no previous interpreter has made 
it. Ironically, the authors note that Kant “admits” the importance sym-
bols have in religion, portraying this as “akin to the Religion-as-Symbol 
motif of Ward and Palmquist” (229). Nowhere do I identify Kantian reli-
gion with symbolism;10 yet IDKR latches onto one word, “symbolically” 
(177–178), to discount KCR’s reading of Kantian atonement, even though 
KCR also defends a much deeper, non-symbolic interpretation,11 similar 
to the one advanced in IDKR. KCR not only agrees with, but directly 
influenced IDKR’s claim that Kant’s first experiment in Religion is essen-
tially a system of the transcendental conditions that make the symbols 
of empirical religion theoretically possible and morally necessary (e.g., 
KCR 148–149).
IDKR contrasts its heretofore allegedly “untried” approach to those of 
past interpreters with bold words like: “Gone was the temptation to trun-
cate the text in order for it to make sense” (234). Yet some past interpreters 
have conducted the kind of holistic analysis IDKR claims to perform; not 
all “truncate the text.” Ironically, the authors’ implied self-assessment, 
that their interpretation does not truncate Kant’s text, turns out to be 
questionable.
Locating Kant’s Two “Experiments”
The novel assumption that most seriously undermines the overall cogency 
of IDKR’s interpretation concerns how to identify Kant’s two “experiments.” 
9See e.g., IDKR, 210 n1. Part 2 criticizes several passages (e.g., 154, 167) that are quoted 
from KCR completely out of context (cf. KCR, 211, 282); taken in its proper context, each pas-
sage actually agrees with IDKR’s position!
10In The Tree of Philosophy: A Course of Introductory Lectures for Beginning Students of Philos-
ophy (Hong Kong: Philopsychy Press, 2000), I do discuss Paul Tillich’s explicit identification 
of symbolism and religion in Lecture 31, just before presenting a holistic, linear summary 
of Kant’s transcendental theory of religion in Lectures 32 and 33. Perhaps this order of ex-
position misled the authors into thinking that on my view Kant also adopts their so-called 
“Religion-as-Symbol” motif.
11See KCR, 165, 210, 215–216, 458–464. The latter passage consists of an entire section, 
entitled “Critical Soteriology and the Problem of Atonement for Sins.”
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The other two assumptions—that Kant’s distinction between pure cognition 
and empirical cognition helps overcome his strictures on God-talk, and that 
“disposition” for Kant refers to “the enduring moral ontology of the human 
being” (122)—are also controversial. But this third assumption is the most 
subtle and problematic. So my second question is: How do you reconcile your 
claims about the location of Kant’s two experiments with the massive amount of con-
trary evidence in Kant’s text?
IDKR’s assumption here is indeed novel: that when Kant distinguishes 
between two experiments in the Prefaces, he intends to develop the first 
experiment entirely in the first three Pieces, modulating to the second 
experiment only in the Fourth Piece. Unfortunately, the authors make 
little effort to rebut previously published evidence contradicting their 
position. They merely assert: “Kant’s explication of rational religion in the 
first experiment refers specifically to Books One, Two, and Three” (203). 
Yet Kant makes no such claim. Without any significant textual backing,12 
their assertion amounts to intriguing eisegesis.
The authors’ assumption is instructive, though mistaken. In describing 
Kant’s account of the two experiments, they claim the first “considers only 
natural religion,” while the second relates natural religion to a specific 
revelation (114); yet Kant introduces “natural religion” only in the Fourth 
Piece, never mentioning it in the Prefaces. By assuming the first experi-
ment corresponds to what Kant later calls “natural religion,” they cleverly 
make their assumption appear self-evident: the Fourth Piece, being the 
only place where Religion discusses how natural religion as such relates 
to a purported revelation, must constitute the second experiment! This is 
not merely a verbal quibble; it has far-reaching implications for how we 
understand the two experiments and the overall goal of Religion.
Two problems plague IDKR’s assumption. First, it leaves unexplained 
why Kant examines scriptural claims to revelation not only in the Fourth 
Piece, but throughout Religion. He compares Scriptural claims to rational 
doctrines in each Piece, discussing in each case whether the doctrine 
“lead[s] back to the same pure rational system of religion”—this being 
Kant’s description of how the first experiment (the “pure rational system”) 
relates to the second (Religion, 12). The section-by-section exegesis in KCR’s 
Chapter VIII carefully analyses how the whole Religion text weaves the 
two experiments together like two sides of a tapestry, so that character-
istics of both experiments are visible in each Piece. The details presented 
in KCR demonstrate what I can only summarize here: the second experi-
ment comes into focus toward the end of each Piece. Thus, the last section 
of the First Piece (necessarily downplayed in IDKR) explicitly modulates 
to an examination of the Christian doctrine of original sin, highlight-
ing its origin in “Scripture” (Religion, 41); KCR 202–207 interprets this as 
12Our authors claim the word “test” (Religion, 156) signals this modulation; yet Kant’s 
word, prüfen, carries a distinctive meaning that is irrelevant to the two experiments: “Ver-
such” (see note 7, above) never occurs in this allegedly crucial passage.
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Kant’s crucial first stage “[i]n carrying out his second experiment” (KCR, 
202). Similarly, in the Second Piece, Section Two begins “Holy Scripture 
. . . sets forth this intelligible moral relation in the form of a story” (Re-
ligion, 78), then compares the scriptural account of salvation with the 
rational account Kant himself defended in Section One; significantly, 
instead of responding to the explicit claim in KCR 165, 207–216, that Kant 
is here developing an important “second stage” in his second experiment, 
IDKR mentions Section Two only once, incorrectly identifying it as part 
of the General Comment (166; cf. 155). The Third Piece, likewise, has two 
major “Divisions”: Division One, a “Philosophical Presentation” (Religion, 
95), focuses on the first experiment (KCR, 165–175), while Division Two’s 
“Historical Presentation” (Religion, 124) focuses on the second experiment 
(KCR, 216–229). IDKR goes to great lengths to rationalize why Division 
Two says so much about Christianity (185), something the authors think 
Kant should have put in the Fourth Piece (e.g., 192). What is puzzling here 
is not that IDKR proposes a new suggestion regarding the location of the 
two experiments, but that in spite of their masterful overview of the litera-
ture in Part 1, the authors miss a golden opportunity to defend their novel 
assumption, had they argued against the alternative defended at length 
in KCR. Instead of taking up that challenge in IDKR, the authors simply 
remain silent about what is arguably the most detailed, textually-based 
alternative reading in the literature.13
The second (and arguably more serious) problem posed by the authors’ 
assumption about the location of the two experiments is that their account 
implies the arguments of the Fourth Piece play no formal role in Kant’s system 
of rational religion (i.e., in the first experiment). Ironically, their summary 
of the purpose of the Fourth Piece implies its sole task cannot be to con-
duct the second experiment. Because in the Third Piece Kant has argued 
that the weakness of human nature requires empirical manifestations 
of the invisible church (and because we humans must be in charge of 
organizing these structures), Kant emphasizes in the Fourth Piece the im-
portance of keeping such empirical structures well “pruned” (228). If the 
authors’ assumption were correct, then this metaphorical pruning would 
apply only to Christian churches, not to the practice of rational religion 
as such or to manifestations of other historical faiths. Interestingly, the 
authors inadvertently imply that Kant is here also thinking of the first 
13While KCR’s Chapter VII presents itself as a thoroughgoing attempt to trace Kant’s 
first experiment through the entire text of Religion, by contrast, Chapter VIII explicitly aims 
to focus on an “examination of Kant’s second experiment” (KCR, 196). That discerning the 
precise locations of the two experiments is one of the main topics of these two chapters of 
KCR is evidenced by the fact that the word “experiment” occurs twenty times in the former 
chapter and twenty-six times in the latter chapter. A summary of my position on “Kant’s 
second experiment” is presented at KCR, 201–202: “Books One and Two correspond . . . to 
the Old and New Testament, respectively. Books Three and Four likewise correspond to 
early church history and traditional forms of Christian worship.” When I discussed this 
interpretation of the two experiments with one of the authors at length in 2004, while work-
ing together on a co-edited book, he assured me that his lack of a persuasive response 
would be fully rectified in IDKR.
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experiment, for they refer to “the dual perspective of the two experi-
ments” (228); even while discussing Christianity in the Fourth Piece, Kant 
also says something essential about the first experiment. As KCR’s linear 
analysis demonstrates, one side of the tapestry cannot be woven without 
threads appearing on the other side!
If the Fourth Piece consists entirely and only of Kant’s second experiment 
(210), then the distinction between true and false service of God, made in its 
title, would apply only to Christians. This distinction plays an indispens-
able (though regulative, hypothetical) role in completing Kant’s system of 
rational religion (see KCR, 229–235), yet IDKR’s assumption regarding the 
purpose of the Fourth Piece forces the authors to ignore this role. If their 
novel assumption were correct, then wouldn’t Kant’s title indicate his intent 
to modulate to his long-awaited consideration of Christianity? IDKR never 
addresses the obvious problem of why Kant avoids mentioning Christian-
ity in the title of the Fourth Piece, if conducting the second experiment is 
actually its sole purpose.
IDKR’s account of “the opening of Book Four” (211) is technically cor-
rect, but misleading, because it does not describe all that Kant accom-
plishes there. Readers unfamiliar with Religion would not know, merely 
from reading IDKR, that (following a summary of the first-experiment 
argument up to this point) this opening section explains the key rational 
distinction between true and false service of God. To persuade their read-
ers that the Fourth Piece makes no contribution to the first experiment, 
the authors must downplay this distinction, since it is a crucial component 
of Kant’s system of rational religion. Even though Kant emphasizes this 
focus both in the title of the Fourth Piece and in its opening section, IDKR 
discusses Kant’s theory of true and false service only nineteen pages into 
chapter 8 (227)—just five pages before the end.
IDKR points out that the Fourth Piece is divided into sections consid-
ering natural religion and revealed religion. The authors’ discussion of 
these terms is accurate (219–220), though incomplete; it does not justify 
the conclusion drawn from it regarding the location of the second ex-
periment. Because Kant associates both sections with Christianity, the 
authors assume both must refer to the second experiment. But the first 
section explicitly argues that Christianity at its core is a natural religion; 
as the authors admit, the latter is the topic of the first experiment. Kant’s 
distinction between natural and learned religion correlates more unam-
biguously to the distinction between the first and second experiments, 
as the authors acknowledge (220). Why would Kant deal with natural 
religion at such length in a Piece that concerns only the second exper-
iment? An even greater problem is that they never convey what Kant 
presents as the main purpose of his “turn” to the distinction between 
natural and revealed religion in the Fourth Piece. His purpose is not (as 
IDKR claims) to begin conducting his second experiment, having finally 
completed the first. Rather, his aim (Religion, 182; see also 105; cf. KCR, 
175–183) is to answer the question: How does God want to be served in a 
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church? Answering this question is as crucial to the first experiment as to 
the second. Is that why IDKR never calls attention to Kant’s explicit aim? 
Acknowledging Kant’s focus would have required the authors to revise 
their view of the second experiment’s location, abandoning one of their 
three novel assumptions.
Is the “much-debated distinction” (211) between true and false service 
to be identified solely with Kant’s second experiment? IDKR repeatedly 
identifies the second experiment with the entire Fourth Piece, yet admits 
the turn to the second experiment actually occurs only after Kant makes 
this distinction in the introductory section. Ironically, IDKR’s discussion 
of the second experiment does not begin until the second section of Chap-
ter 8. What then is the status of Kant’s preliminary distinction, as put 
forward in the introductory section (and in the Piece title)? Is it, or is it 
not, part of his defense of the first experiment’s transcendental system of 
religion? If it is, then the Fourth Piece does contain arguments essential to 
the first experiment.
This second line of questioning can be summed up with a twofold 
question: How can the authors reconcile their interpretation of the two experi-
ments with the fact that Kant (a) establishes a crucial aspect of his system of ratio-
nal religion in the Fourth Piece, and (b) considers how Christianity fits the mold 
of rational religion in each of the four Pieces, especially in the final major section 
of each Piece? This question is intensified when we note that IDKR says 
almost nothing about the General Comments appended to each Piece. Its 
account of the two experiments thus raises a further question: In what 
way do the first three General Comments (dealing with Effects of Grace, 
Miracles, and Mysteries) relate solely to the first experiment, while the 
fourth General Comment (dealing with Means of Grace) relates solely to 
the second experiment? Without a persuasive answer, we are left with 
no other alternative than to conclude that IDKR inadvertently commits 
the very error it accuses all past interpreters of committing: making their 
position appear more persuasive than it actually is by truncating Kant’s 
text wherever conflicting evidence arises.
IDKR’s Problem-Driven Hermeneutic
IDKR’s exegesis of Religion is driven by “conundrums” presented in the 
writings of several critics. In itself, this is a legitimate expository strategy, 
but it can produce only limited results: demonstrating that the conun-
drums can be solved. A good example of the impact of this problem-
driven hermeneutic comes when the authors discuss the General Com-
ment to the Fourth Piece. They mention this intriguing climax of Kant’s 
text only in passing, saying they need not discuss the issues because it “is 
not considered a source of conundrums” (228). However, these issues are 
a source of significant misunderstandings (see KCR, 147–148, 472–497): re-
ductionist interpreters frequently refer to this closing section of Religion 
as evidence that Kant merely discards empirical religion. Any serious 
affirmative interpreter must therefore stake a claim on these points of 
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dispute: Is Kant affirming the value of prayer, or denying it? Is he encour-
aging church attendance, or providing a good excuse to stay away? Is he 
disclosing the reason baptism and communion should be preserved, or 
mocking those who still believe in silly rituals? IDKR offers no hint re-
garding how such important questions should be answered. If anything, 
by referring to them as “excesses” (228), the authors imply they read Kant 
as rejecting these elements of what Kant calls indirect service. If so, they 
have (inadvertently?) portrayed Religion as reducing religion to morality 
after all!
The dangers of IDKR’s way of interpreting Kant’s two experiments 
are significant, at least for Christians: its portrayal of Kant’s second 
experiment requires the authors systematically to overlook Kant’s many 
attempts to reform traditional understandings of Christian doctrine and 
practice. The First Piece no longer reveals a moral gap to be filled by scrip-
tural symbols if (as IDKR argues) evil is a fully cognized, Aristotelian 
reality whose depths are laid bare by Kant’s transcendental analysis 
(e.g., 147–151). IDKR’s attempt to dissociate the Second Piece from Kant’s 
second experiment likewise leads the authors to write as if Kant’s lan-
guage is Platonic rather than Christian (158), even though Kant there 
quotes frequently from the Bible. And in discussing the Third Piece 
they read Religion 93–94 as claiming unconverted persons can corrupt the 
disposition of good-hearted persons, when Kant’s argument makes sense 
only if it refers to converted persons corrupting each other;14 with similar 
implausibility, their novel assumption leads them to skew passages in the 
Third Piece, where Kant refers explicitly to Christianity, as if his warn-
ings about the dangers of organized religion refer only to “non-Christian 
faiths” (e.g., 158).
Just as the authors’ assumption about the location of the two experi-
ments adversely influences their understanding of how the first three 
Pieces of Religion relate to historical faiths such as Christianity, it also 
obscures various key factors relating to the role played by the Fourth 
Piece in a rational system of religion. Thus, after reading an alleged “elit-
ist tendency” into the Fourth Piece, their attempt to clear Kant from this 
allegation (202) seems half-hearted. Yet Kant’s rejection of clericalism in 
Religion is anti-elitist in the extreme. Unlike his later Conflict of the Faculties, 
where his discussion of the conflict between religious and philosophical 
scholars in a university has arguably elitist overtones, Kant’s arguments in 
Religion are about how to please God in a church. By reading the assumptions 
of Conflict back into Religion, IDKR makes the potential problem of elitism 
look more important than the text merits.
The upshot is that, unless the authors can demonstrate the advantages 
of their problem-driven hermeneutic in general and of their assumption 
14IDKR, 183 and passim; but cf. KCR, 167–168 and my article, “Kant’s Religious Argu-
ment for the Existence of God—The Ultimate Dependence of Human Destiny on Divine 
Assistance,” Faith and Philosophy 26 (2009), 3–22.
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regarding the two experiments in particular, and can effectively rebut the 
weighty evidence that militates against the latter, IDKR presents the ironic 
picture of two “defenders” of Kant who, in trying to make his claims “co-
herent,” end up portraying Religion in a manner that renders his position 
unworthy of assent, at least for Christians. Were Kant himself able to re-
spond, I suspect he might refuse to address any of the foregoing issues, 
instead merely reciting the old rabbinic prayer: “Lord, protect me from my 
friends; I can take care of my enemies myself!”15
Hong Kong Baptist University
15I comment more generally on IDKR in an invited book review published in The Jour-
nal of Religion 90:2, 49–52. The original version of the present essay, as it was written for 
presentation at the AAR symposium (which, including footnotes, was well over twice the 
length of its present incarnation) can be found at: hkbu.academia.edu/StephenPalmquist/ 
Papers/1387435/Cross-Examination_of_IDKR_at_AAR. Due to other pressing commit-
ments, I was unable to attend that American Academy of Religion conferene (Montreal, 
November 2009). Fortunately, Brandon Love, an Exchange Graduate Student working 
with me in Hong Kong at that time, kindly offered to deliver it on my behalf. This was 
appropriate, not only because Firestone had been the supervisor of Love’s Master Thesis 
(2008–2009), but also because his thesis focused on the very issue I have highlighted in 
the third section of this essay. See Brandon Love, “The Interpretation and Implications 
of Kant’s Two Experiments in Religion” (Trinity International University MA thesis). 
Love briefly surveys the views on the two experiments put forward by Wood, Michalson, 
Reardon, Hare, Collins, Caird, and Despland; he then goes into much greater depth to ex-
amine the positions of KCR (pp. 59–91 and IDKR (pp. 83–99) on this topic, before compar-
ing and contrasting the latter and proposing his new position. I would therefore like to 
thank Brandon for passing on an earlier version of this paper on my behalf at the American 
Academy of Religion conference held in Montreal (November, 2009) and for passing on 
feedback from various persons attending the symposium; Andrew Chignell and an anony-
mous reviewer for some helpful suggestions; and most of all, the authors, for many years 
of fruitful collaboration during which we have proved the validity of the maxim, opposition 
is true friendship.
